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Abstract
In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms
can influence input and output market prices. We show via an example
that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while
the contrary holds when the technology is constant.
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1 Introduction
We provide in this paper a framework to analyse vertical integration and hor-
izontal mergers in a market context, based on early work of the authors ; see
Gabszewicz and Zanaj (2006). The analysis of collusion in successive markets
between downstream and upstream firms often relies on successive quantity
oligopolies. In these markets, firms select a` la Cournot the quantities of output
of the good they produce, the output of the upstream firms serving as an input
for the production of the output in the downstream market. Collusive agree-
ments reduce the total number of decision units operating in the downstream
and upstream markets and, thus, the corresponding number of oligopolists in
each of them. Collusive outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to
this reduced number of oligopolists in each market, which are then compared
with those arising when downstream and upstream firms act independently. The
link between upstream and downstream markets follows from the fact that the
downstream firms’ unit cost appears as the unit revenue for the upstream ones :
the price paid for a unit of input for the firms in the former constitutes the unit
receipt for the firms in the latter. In this paper, we consider the simplest situa-
tion in which, before any collusion takes place, the downstream market consists
of two rival firms while the upstream one embodies three input suppliers. We
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apply to this context the methodology proposed above to study the effects of
vertical integration on input and output prices.
We propose a model which makes explicit how the downstream and upstream
markets are linked to each other via the technology used by the downstream
firms to transform the input into the output. We consider two examples of
technology-linked markets. The first corresponds to a decreasing returns tech-
nology while the other uses a constant returns technology. Our main finding is
that the nature of the technology plays a crucial role on the effects of mergers
concerning the input and output prices.
2 Successive oligopolies with decreasing returns
2.1 The context
Consider two downstream firms facing a linear demand pi(Q) = 1 − Q in the
downstream market with Q denoting aggregate output. They share the same
technology f(z) to produce the output, namely
q = f(z) = z
1
2 .
with z denoting the input used in the production of q. Consider also three
upstream firms each producing the input z at the same linear total cost Cj(sj) =
βsj , j = 1, 2, 3. We assume that this situation gives rise to two games. The
players in the first game are the two downstream firms with output strategies
qi, while the players in the second are the three upstream firms with input
strategies sj .
The profits of the ith downstream firm at the vector of strategies (qi, q−i)
obtains as
Πi(qi, q−i) = (1− qi − q−i)qi − pq2i , i = 1, 2
As a result of the strategic choice qi, each firm i sends the input quantity signal
zi(p) = q2i to the upstream market. When aggregating these signals, we get
the demand function of input over which the upstream firms select their selling
strategies sj . The jth upstream firm’s profit Γj a the vector of strategies writes
as
Γj(sj , s−j) = p(sj , s−j)sj − βsj , (1)
with p(sj , s−j) such that Σ3k=1sk = Σ
2
i=1zi(p).
Given a price p in the input market, the best reply of downstream firm i in
the downstream game obtains as
qi =
1− q−i.
2p+ 2
(2)
2
Clearly, these best replies depend on the upstream market price p and we may
compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the above game, contingent on the
price p. Defining qi = q for i = 1, 2, re-expressing equation (2) and solving it in
q, we get the symmetric solution
q∗i =
1
(3 + 2p)
(3)
so that we obtain
z∗i (p) = z
∗(p) =
1
(3 + 2p)2
; i = 1, 2. (4)
The upstream firms then face a total demand
2∑
i=1
z∗i (p) of input equal to 2z
∗(p).
At a given vector of input strategies chosen by the upstream firms in the up-
stream game, the input price clearing the upstream market must satisfy
2
(3 + 2p)2
= Σ3j=1sj ,
so that we get
p(sj , s−j) =
√
2
4Σ3j=1sj
− 3
2
. (5)
Substituting (5) into (1), the payoff function Γj(sj , s−j) of the upstream firm j
in the upstream game rewrites as
Γj(sj , s−j) = (
√
2
4Σ3j=1sj
− 3
2
)sj − βsj .
Notice that the profit function Γj is concave in sj , j = 1, 2, 3, so that we can use
the first order necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the symmetric
equilibrium. Accordingly, at the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the upstream
game, we obtain
s∗(β) =
25
54 (2β + 3)2
.
Finally, the equilibrium price p∗(β) in the input market obtains as
p∗(β) =
6
5
β +
3
10
.
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quan-
tities z∗of input bought by each downstream firm, as given by (4), we get
z∗(β) =
25
36 (2β + 3)2
3
so that, from (3), we obtain
q∗i (β) = q
∗(β) =
5
6 (2β + 3)
.
Therefore, the resulting output price pi∗(β) in the downstream market obtains
as
pi∗(β) =
6β + 4
6β + 9
.
3 Vertical integration
Consider that one of the downstream firms vertically integrates with one of the
upstream firms. After this merger, we move from an initial situation comprising
globally five firms to a new one, with two firms in the downstream market and
a duopoly in the upstream one. We assume complete foreclosure. Indeed, the
integrated entity now internalizes output production by using the input provided
at a marginal cost β by the upstream firm belonging to the new entity.
Let us first consider the game played among downstream firms operating in
the downstream market after collusion takes place. The new sturcutre of the
market is an asymmetric Cournot. The payoff of the integrated firm I is given
by
ΠI(qI,qi) = (1− qI − qi)qI − βq2I ,
with i denoting the downstream firm i, i 6= I, not belonging to the integrated
entity which payoffs Πi(qi, qI) is given by
Πi(qi, qI) = (1− qi − qI)qi − pq2i ). (6)
Since ΠI is concave, we may use the first order condition to get the best response
function of the integrated entity in the downstream market game as
qI =
1− qi
2β + 2
. (7)
As for the downstream firm i, i 6= I, its best reply in the downstream market is
conditional on the input price p realized in the upstream market, namely
qi =
1− qI
2 + 2p
(8)
Solving the system of equations (7) and (8), we get the output quantities as
qi =
2β + 1
4p+ 4β + 4pβ + 3
,
qI =
2p+ 1
4p+ 4β + 4pβ + 3
.
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Consequently, as expected, the downstream equilibrium is conditional on the
input price obtained in the upstream market as a result of supply and demand
in this market. There is only one downstream firm with input demand identical
to the total demand in the upstream market, namely, qi(p) = ( 2β+14p+4β+4pβ+3 )
2.
As for the supply, it comes from the strategies sj , j 6= I, selected by the un-
integrated upstream firms in this market. Consider one of the two upstream
firms which do not belong to the entity. Its profit Γj at the vector of strategies
(sj , s−j) writes as
Γj(sj , s−j) = p(sj , s−j)sj − βsj ,
with p(sj , s−j) such that sj + s−j = qi(p), namely
p(sj , s−j) =
1
4β + 4
(√
sj + s−j
sj + s−j
(2β + 1)− 4β − 3
)
. (9)
Therefore, at the symmetric equilibrium in the upstream market, each uninte-
grated firm supplies a quantity s∗j of input which obtain as
1
s∗ =
9
32 (2β + 3)2
.
Substituting the expression of s∗j in the demand function (9) we get the input
price p∗ as
p∗ =
60β + 32β2 + 21
4β + 4
.
Furthermore, substituting p∗ in the expression of qi and qI , we obtain
q∗i =
1
8 (2β + 2)
,
q∗I =
16β + 23
16 (β + 1) (2β + 3)
.
The price pi∗ of the output obtains as
pi∗ =
1
16
(2β + 1) (16β + 23)
(β + 1) (2β + 3)
.
We have now the equilibrium quantities and price for both cases with, and
without, vertical integration. It can be shown from a direct comparison of
prices that this merger determines both an increase in the output price and an
increase in the input prices. Consider first the input market. The merger causes
a decrease of both the number of demanders of input and suppliers of it. So,
1To determine the optimal input supply per firm see footnote 9 in Gabszewicz and Zanaj
(2006).
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at least theoretically, there would be a priori place for an increase or decrease
of the input price. Under a decreasing returns technology in the downstream
market, the change in the input demand resulting from the merger countervails
the change in the input supply always leading to an increase in the input price.
Concerning the output market, the merger reduces the production cost of the
firm in the entity. But, on the other hand, the merger increases the production
cost of the other firm, since it leads to a higher input price. It turns out that,
in this framework, the first effect is dominated by the second, so that the output
price increases.
Figure 1: Output price with and with-
out mergers
Figure 2: Input prices with and without
mergers
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4 Constant returns
We consider exactly the same case as above, with the exception that the tech-
nology f(z) shared by the downstream firms is now given by
f(z) = αz, α > 0
as in Salinger (1988) and Gaudet and Van Long (1996)(with α = 1 in the
latter case).We also assume that α ≥ β: this assumption guarantees that the
marginal cost of producing the input does not exceed its marginal product in
the production of output2. The profits Πi(qi, q−i) of the ith downstream firm
at the vector of strategies (qi, q−i) now obtains as
Πi(qi, q−i) = (1− qi − q−i)qi − pzi.
As a result of the strategic choice qi, each firm i sends an input quantity signal
zi(p) = qiα to the upstream market. Rewriting the profit function of each firm
in terms of input z, we may compute the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the
above game contingent on the input price p,namely
z∗(p) =
α− p
3α2
, (10)
so that
q∗ =
α− p
3α
. (11)
Given the input strategies chosen by the upstream firms in the second stage
game, the input price clearing the upstream market must satisfy
2(α− p)
3α2
= Σ3j=1sj
so that, for this example, we get
p(sj , s−j) = α− α2 32Σ
3
j=1sj (12)
Substituting (12) into the payoff function Γj(sj , s−j) we have
Γj(sj , s−j) =
(
α− 3α
2
2
Σ3j=1sj
)
sj − βsj ,
leading to the best response function
sj(s−j) =
1
3α2
(α− β)− Σ2−j=1s−j .
Accordingly, at the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage game, we obtain
2We also assume that α ≥ β: this assumption guarantees that the marginal cost of pro-
ducing the input does not exceed its marginal product in the production of output.
7
s∗(β) =
(α− β)
6α2
.
Finally, the equilibrium price in the input market obtains as
p∗(α, β) =
1
4
α+
3
4
β. (13)
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities
z∗i of input bought by each downstream firm, as given by (10), we get
z∗(α, β) =
1
4α2
(α− β) ,
so that
q∗i (α, β) =
1
4α
(α− β) .
Accordingly, the resulting output price pi∗(m,n) in the downstream market
obtains as3
pi∗(m,n) =
1
12α
(6α+ 6β) .
4.1 Modelling collusion with constant returns technology
Assume again that two firms, one upstream and one downstream merge. Let
us first consider the game played between the two firms operating in the down-
stream market after collusion takes place. The payoff of the integrated firm I
is given by
ΠI(qI,qi) = (1− qI − qi)qI − β qI
α
. As for the downstream firm i, not belonging to the integrated entity, it has as
payoff
Πi(qi, qI) = (1− qi − qI)qi − p(qi
α
). (14)
It is clear from the above payoffs that the main difference between the collusive
and non collusive members in the downstream market comes from the fact that
the former pays its input at marginal cost β while the latter buys it at the input
price p. Since ΠI is concave, we may use the first order condition to get the best
reply function of the integrated entity and the unintegrated firm. solving the
resulting system, we get the equilibrium output quantities q∗I (α, β, p) as
q∗I (α, β; p) =
α− β + (p− β)
3α
and
q∗i (α, β; p) =
α− 2p+ β
3α
. (15)
3Notice that, in order to have pi∗(m,n) ≥ p∗(m,n), - the requirement needed to guarantee
the survival of firms in the downstream market -, no condition on α is required.
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Consequently, as expected, the downstream equilibrium is conditional on the
input price obtained in the upstream market as a result of supply and demand
in this market. There is only one firm with total demand equal to q∗i (p;β) =
α−2p+β
3α . As for the supply, it comes from the strategies (sj , s−j), selected by
the unintegrated upstream firms in this market. Consider the jth upstream firm
which does not belong to the entity. Its profit Γj at the vector of strategies
(sj , s−j) writes as
Γj(sj , s−j) = p(sj , s−j)sj − βsj ,
with p(sj , s−j) such that sj + s−j = zi, namely
p(sj , s−j) =
(α+ β)− 3α2 (sj + s−j)
2
(16)
. Accordingly, the payoff of the j-th upstream firm writes as
Γj(sj , s−j) =
(
(α+ β)− 3α2 (sj + s−j)
2
)
sj − βsj .
Therefore , at the symmetric equilibrium in the upstream market, the uninte-
grated firm supplies a quantity s∗jof input which obtains as
s∗j (α, β) =
(α− β)
9α2
.
Substituting the expression of s∗j in (16) we get the equilibrium input price
p∗(α, β) as
p∗(α, β) =
1
6
α+
5
6
β. (17)
Substituting (17) in (15) we get the output supply q∗i (α, β) and q
∗
I (α, β) of each
unintegrated downstream firm, namely
q∗i (α, β) =
2
9α
(α− β) ;
q∗I (α, β) =
7
18α
(α− β) .
Hence, the resulting output price pi∗is given by
pi∗(α, β) =
1
18α
(7α+ 11β) .
It can be easily checked (see graph 3 and 4) that, when downstream firms
have a constant returns technology, and a vertical merger takes place, we get
exactly the reverse result as in the case of decreasing returns: in the case of a
merger, both the output and input prices decrease.
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5 Concluding remarks
Starting from our previous work, we have analysed here the effects of vertical
mergers in the framework of successive oligopolies on input and output prices,
when these are determined by the market mechanism. Our analysis is based on
a comparison between the market outcomes with, and without, merger. The
interest of this approach, it seems to us, consists in showing how these effects
are related to the technology used in the production of final goods. It is indeed
the latter which determines the demand function of the downstream firms in
the input market. When a merger forms, it creates a reduction in total input
demand since the integrated entity produces output internally at marginal cost.
Similarly, with complete foreclosure (as assumed), a merger reduces input sup-
ply since the entity does not participate in the upstream market anymore. The
question is to know whether a demand decrease, combined with a supply de-
crease would lead to higher, or smaller prices in the two markets concerned by
the merger. Surprisingly, the answer to this question is not unequivocal since,
under decreasing returns to scale, both prices increase while the reverse is true
in the case of constant returns !
Mergers are expected to influence market conditions because they internalize
production costs reducing thereby the effects of double marginalization. Further-
more, they decrease competition in the input market by reducing the number
of competitors. Thus a decrease in the output price is a priori expected from
the reduction of double marginalisation, and this is indeed the case when down-
stream firms use a constant returns technology. By contrast, under decreasing
returns, the reverse consequence is observed : the output price increases. Why
is it so ? As usual, the reduction of double marginalisation increases the output
supply of the entity. However, it increases the cost of production of the down-
stream which did not adhere to the entity, to such an extent that the reduction
of its output level finally increases the output price: this decrease does not
compensate the effect on price of the entity output increase. As stated above,
mergers (under complete foreclosure) reduce the number of firms operating in
the upstream market, and thus, it must be anticipated that their existence re-
duces competition and increases input price. However, under constant returns,
it has the opposite effect. Why is it so ? The explanation lies in the behaviour
of the unintegrated downstream firm. Due to the merger, this firm considerably
reduces its production level in the output market and, accordingly, its demand in
the input market becomes smaller at any input price. This leads to a reduction
of the input price.
In this paper, we have only scratched a research territory which looks very
promising. The theory of successive markets allows us to treat various forms of
collusion based on the market mechanism, which provides a natural way to eval-
uate the profitability of such collusive arrangements. Another potential avenue
for an alternative profitability evaluation would consist in relying on strategic
market games. From this viewpoint, Gabszewicz and al. would constitute a
natural departure point for researchers interested in the field.
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Figure 3: Output price with and with-
out mergers
Figure 4: Input prices with and without
mergers
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